本文目录一览:
前面和大家分享五行辩证关系之“五行相制”,这一期和大家分享一下五行的“相弱”。
一、金衰遇火,必见销熔
意思就是说当金很小很弱的时候,遇到火就必然会被火熔化,比如说你将一块小小的铁块掉进熔炉里,铁块很快就会被火熔化。
二、火弱逢水,必为熄灭
也就是说当火很小的时候遇到水,必然会被水浇灭,比方说火灾刚开始很小的时候这个时候你拿一盆水直接浇上去,火马上就会被灭了。
三、水弱逢土,必为淤塞
意思就是讲当水流很小的时候就可以直接用土将其围住,就像农忙时,大家都会用土围水来将水导引到农田来灌溉农作物。
四、土衰遇木,必遭倾陷
当土的能量很弱,土地很软的时候一棵小草都能够很轻易地破土成长,就像一句话说的,无心插柳柳成荫,又好比方说你在走霉运的时候,越容易遭受到别人的排挤。
五、木弱逢金,必为砍折
当木的能量很弱的时候轻易就能够折断,就比方说一颗枯树枝,你随便找把斧头很轻易的就能够将其砍断,这就是木弱逢金、必为砍折。
前面和大家分享五行辩证关系之“五行相制”,这一期和大家分享一下五行的“相弱”。
一、金衰遇火,必见销熔
意思就是说当金很小很弱的时候,遇到火就必然会被火熔化,比如说你将一块小小的铁块掉进熔炉里,铁块很快就会被火熔化。
二、火弱逢水,必为熄灭
也就是说当火很小的时候遇到水,必然会被水浇灭,比方说火灾刚开始很小的时候这个时候你拿一盆水直接浇上去,火马上就会被灭了。
三、水弱逢土,必为淤塞
意思就是讲当水流很小的时候就可以直接用土将其围住,就像农忙时,大家都会用土围水来将水导引到农田来灌溉农作物。
四、土衰遇木,必遭倾陷
当土的能量很弱,土地很软的时候一棵小草都能够很轻易地破土成长,就像一句话说的,无心插柳柳成荫,又好比方说你在走霉运的时候,越容易遭受到别人的排挤。
五、木弱逢金,必为砍折
当木的能量很弱的时候轻易就能够折断,就比方说一颗枯树枝,你随便找把斧头很轻易的就能够将其砍断,这就是木弱逢金、必为砍折。
今日,一位前列腺增生并发膀胱结石的日本患者成功接受“无血无痛保功能前列腺激光剜除术”,这是同济大学附属东方医院首次为外国友人实施该手术,在疫情期间做好外籍人员的健康保障。
手术由泌尿外科主任杨国胜主刀。在使用激光无血碎石后,杨国胜使用其独创的被称为“杨氏金箍棒”的激光器械,将患者增大的前列腺组织完整切除,切除组织被粉碎器粉碎吸出,整个手术仅用时半小时便顺利结束,手术无任何刀疤,术中无出血。患者术后预期24小时即可拔除导尿管,48小时即可出院。
日本患者小池功一今年79岁,是一名石油行业工程师,曾参与大庆油田的建设工作。近10余年来,他一直长期生活在上海。一周前,老人突发血尿,排尿困难。疫情期间,由于他难以回日本诊治,心急如焚。其家属了解到,目前日本已开展当今世界上最先进的前列腺激光手术,希望小池先生的血尿和结石获得先进的激光治疗。
经过多方打听,小池的家人了解到东方医院泌尿外科有最先进的激光设备,而且杨国胜擅长前列腺激光手术,特此来到其门诊就诊。杨国胜详细询问了病史并通过检查,发现其前列腺比正常人增大至少3倍,而且膀胱内长了3枚结石,最大的一颗竟然有鸡蛋那么大!
明确小池先生是患了前列腺增生继发膀胱结石,引起的血尿和排尿困难后,杨国胜说,患者需要尽早行钬激光膀胱碎石和前列腺激光切除手术。为了让这名外国患者对手术和病情有更好的理解,杨国胜手画解剖图,形象风趣地跟解释了目前的病情,告诉患者由于前列腺增生堵塞尿道,相当于河流淤塞,膀胱内长期残留尿液,形成了结石,并且结石越来越大,必须尽快手术。
据了解,小池先生曾经对中国医院的医疗设备和医生技术水平持怀疑态度,并一度犹豫手术。杨国胜为此表示,东方医院泌尿外科的设备、技术并不亚于日本,他也曾于2018年日本大阪大学附属医院医学院交流展示无血经尿道前列腺激光手术,得到过日本同行的充分认可。小池为此下定决心,留在上海接受手术。住院期间,为了更好的医患沟通,杨国胜还专门为患者配备了一台翻译机。
据悉,杨国胜团队目前已经成功开展3000余例该手术,该患者是疫情期间接受该手术的第一位外国友人。疫情期间,医院也全力保障在华外国人士的身体健康。
栏目主编:顾泳 文字编辑:黄杨子
内河港口的另一个危险是淤塞,比如长江或密西西比河内的港口,很多大型船舶都可以挂靠,但受限于其船长船宽,一旦有船舶在河内搁浅,势必造成通航受阻。尤其是航道可能由于淤泥堆积出现浅滩,除非有经验的船长或引航员驾驶该船,否则它很容易搁浅座底。对于承租人和出租人来说,更大的问题是当他们不得不承担别的船搁浅,所带来的航道或河流关闭的时间损失。
比如在The Hermine [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 212 (C.A.)案中,Unitramp(以下简称“出租人”)与Garnac Grain Co.Inc.(以下简称“承租人”)在 1973年5月17日以巴尔的摩C格式签订了一份三个航次的合同,船由出租人提名委派。第一次航次的受载期是1973年11月15日到1973年12月26日。在1973年11月30日,出租人委派Hermine轮去执行该航次任务。该轮能够在35英尺10.5英寸的淡水吃水中运载29,532长吨的粮食,并且承租人要求装载满舱满载货物。
该租船合同条规定:1/2个安全泊位,1个安全美湾港口,New Orleans,
Destrehan, Ama, Myrtle Grove Reserve,算作1个港口。
. . . one (1)/two (2) safe berths, one (1) safe port U.S. Gulf . . . understood New Orleans, Destrehan, Ama, Myrtle Grove Reserve, count as one (1) port.
在1973年12月27日,承租人指定Destrehan为装货港。
Destrehan位于密西西比河上,距离公海约140海里。从Destrehan开航,Hermine不得不沿着河流穿过SW Pass,这是一条经过冲刷和挖掘的通道。根据一年中的时间,河流的速度以及疏浚机构的能源和资源,渠道的深度不时变化。当局每天发布一份控制吃水,这代表了建议的最大深度基于淡水的装载吃水,无论潮汐如何。
船舶从Destrehan到海口航行通常需要10到12个小时的时间,但1974年1月27日0045该轮完成装载时,推迟到1974年3月5日。该轮会已被推迟到1974年3月12日,但因为船舶的吃水已减少到33英尺7英寸。
造成延误的原因是(1)1月27日0045到1月31日的0530由于拥堵;其主要原因是严重大雾,限制了在密西西比河通行;2)1月31日0530 到2月4日1800之间,是由于Texaco Florida轮偏离航道在SW Pass搁浅,堵塞了航道通行;(3)从2月4日0800到2月24日,由于缺水导致可航吃水减少到34英尺6英寸,导致船舶无法航行;(4)从2月24日到3月5日,Mary Lou轮在入口处搁浅。
争议的主要焦点
出租人找承租人索赔由于缺水造成的延误以及由于Mary Lou轮搁浅造成的延误,这是延误的直接后果。
争议被提交仲裁, 仲裁员在一个非常漫长而细致的裁决中得出的结论是,Destrehan不是一个不安全的港口,并且在一定程度上可以观察到这一点。
1.在Destrehan,以及Destrehan和大海之间,船舶没有受到任何通过普通良好航海技术无法避免的危险。
2.在Destrehan,密西西比河通过期间或延迟期间或因延误期间,船舶或其货物未遭受任何损害。
出租人认为没错,船舶没有受到危险,但这并没有什么区别,因为船舶被河水条件锁住,导致港口不安全,没有物理损坏这一事实并不能阻止出租人追偿如果违反安全保证,则追偿延误赔偿。
但仲裁员拒绝了出租人的索赔,他们在法院的裁决中说明了法律问题。考虑到阐明的法律权威,一致认为,在指定时和Hermine轮挂靠Destrehan时,Destrehan港是租船合同意义上的安全港口。但是以法院意见的特殊案件的形式表明了他们的裁决,法院需要裁决法律问题是:无论是根据事实认定还是租船合同的真正解释,出租人都有权获得 1974年2月4日1800至1974年3月5日1348之间对船舶开始航程延误的损害赔偿。
商事法院判决
商事法院的Donaldson法官认为
(1)已有法律很好地确立,如果船舶能够抵达,使用及离开则港口使安全的,在没有发生异常事件的情况下,运用良好的航行及航海技术能够避免船舶暴露于危险之中。
(2)根据本租船合同条款,承租人根据合同享有的唯一权利是指定一个安全港口,并根据租约指定港口,承租人默示保证这是一个安全的港口;保证是绝对的,但其中包含与异常事件有关的限定。
(3)租船合同按其条款规定,出租人须向承租人提供一张空白支票,以便在接受租船合同前,他不能考虑他被命令装卸的港口的优点或缺点;延迟不应该达到使冒险受挫的程度的限定是不正确的,并且程度可以最好地定义为延迟,在签订合同当时这对于当时有关类型的船舶的合理出租人来说是商业上不可接受的。
(4)如果仲裁员采用了正确的测试,他们就会得出结论,Destrehan不是一个安全的港口;主张延迟的主要原因是港口的拥堵和不缺乏安全是完全错误的,因为保证并非港口是安全的,如果它是不拥堵的,那是安全的,Destrehan并不是安全的港口,出租人有权从承租人那里追偿损害赔偿。
(5)法律问题的答案是,在2月4日1800时至1974年3月5日1348之间,出租人有权就船舶开航延误而有权获得损害赔偿。
-Held, by Q.B. (Com. Ct.) (DONALDSON, J.), that (1) it was well settled law that a port was safe if the vessel could reach it, use it and leave it without, in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which could not be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.
(2) the charterers' sole right under a contract in the terms of this charter-party was to nominate a safe port and in nominating a port under the charter, the charterers impliedly warranted that it was a safe port; the warranty was absolute but contained within itself the qualification in relation to abnormal occurrences.
(3) the charter by its terms required the owner to give the charterer something of a blank cheque in that he could not consider the merits or demerits of the port at which he was ordered to load or discharge before he accepted the charter; the qualification that the delay should not be of such a degree as to frustrate the adventure could not be right and the degree could best be defined as delay which would be commercially unacceptable to a reasonable owner of a ship of the type concerned at the time when the charter-party was concluded;
(4) if the arbitrators had applied the correct test, they would have concluded that Destrehan was not a safe port; the submission that the proximate cause of the delay complained of was congestion and not lack of safety in the port was wholly fallacious in that the warranty was not that the port was safe if it was uncongested, it was that it was safe, Destrehan was not a safe port and the owners were therefore entitled to recover damages from the charterers;
(5) the question of law would be answered by holding that the owners were entitled to damages in respect of the delay to the vessel in prosecuting her voyage between 18 00 hours on Feb. 4, and 13 48 hours on Mar. 5, 1974.
Award remitted to arbitrators.
Donaldson法官将裁决发回仲裁员,承租人不服判决上诉。
上诉法院判决
上诉法院的Roskill勋爵(当时是)认为该法院再次被要求考虑一个特定港口不安全的指控引起的问题,出问题的港口是密西西比州大约140英里的Destrehan。特定港口或泊位是安全还是不安全的概念是 - 或者至少应该是简单的-因为租船合同中的这种安全保证的主要目的是确保承租人具有其他不受约束的权利指定港口或泊位,不以危及出租人的船舶,或者可能是出租人的雇员的生命,通过将船舶或那些生命置于危险中并由此施加在船上或泊位上的方式出租人有经济损失的风险。对租船人指定权的这种限制对出租人至关重要,因为根据运输合同的条款,无论是期租合同还是承租合同,出租人都与承租人签订,也就是说,只要这些指示符合租船合同条款,他们的雇员船长,高级船员和船员就会遵守承租人的命令的承诺。Roskill勋爵认为,这个概念应该很简单,但不幸的是,它的简单性导致了许多决定,这些决定曾一度对安全保证的确切含义和范围提出了相当大的质疑。因此,每次出现不安全港口或不安全泊位的问题时,显然有必要为了确定法律,在上个世纪和现在进行多项决定。令人高兴的是,情况已经不复存在了。由于在本案例中所谓的20世纪50年代的决策三部曲,Roskill勋爵认为正如他冒昧地想的那样,法律现在很明显,至少就这些案件所说的而言。
第一个是Compania Naviera Maropan S.A. v.Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.,[1955] 2 Q.B.68案。在该案中通常所涉及的船为The Stork,这是Devlin法官(当时是)在本法院确认的决定(见[1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep.349)。该案件在将要提及的澳大利亚高等法院提交的案件的审理和枢密院的听证会之间决定的。Devlin法官和本法院均表示强烈倾向于后者的澳大利亚首席大法官Owen Dixon爵士的反对判决,并且反对判决随后在本院The Stock案中作出决定后不久得到批准,Smith Line Ltd. v. Australian Wheat Board, [1956] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1; [1956] A.C. 266, 即著名的The Houston City案,到达了枢密院。
第三个案件是Pearson法官(当时他是)的决定,在本法院确认,Leeds Shipping Co. Ltd.v. SociétéFran‡aise Bunge [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep.127,The Eastern案。本法院适用了刚才提到的两个案件所确定的法律。
Roskill勋爵认为如果他可以恭敬地称之为法律的现状,那么经典陈述就是Sellers勋爵在The Eastern City案中在第131页右手栏所说:
如果说某个港口不安全,除非在相关的时间内,特定船舶可以到达该港口,在没有发生异常情况的情况下使用并从中返回,不会发生危险,通过良好的航行和航海技术能够避免,它可能会满足所有情况作为一个广泛的法律声明。大多数(如果不是全部)可通航的河流,河道,港口,港湾和泊位都有来自潮汐,水流,河道,堤坝或护岸的危险。这些危险通常通过灯,浮标,信号,警告和其他航行辅助工具最小化,并且通常可以通过根据良好的航海技术适当导航和处理船舶来满足和克服。
Roskill勋爵认为这是最新的法律声明,法院受其约束。如果以这样说,会尊重地同意,应该适用于本案。
The classic statement, if I may respectfully so call it, of the present state of the law is that of Lord Justice Sellers at p. 131 in the righthand colum in The Eastern City:
If it were said that a port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship, it would probably meet all circumstances as a broad statement of the law. Most, if not all, navigable rivers, channels, ports, harbours and berths have some dangers from tides, currents, swells, banks, bars or revetments. Such dangers are frequently minimised by lights, buoys, signals, warnings and other aids to navigation and can normally be met and overcome by proper navigation and handling of a vessel in accordance with good seamanship . . .
That is the latest statement of the law. We are bound by it. If I may say so, I respectfully agree with it, and that is the case which in my judgment should be applied in the present case.
Roskill勋爵认为在这些不安全的港口或不安全的泊位案件中,尽管律师一再试图这样做,但现在很难再回顾早先的许多决定,在本案中强烈反对这种做法。Roskill勋爵认为有明确规定的法律,在每种情况下,仲裁庭必须确定的是,根据具体事实,特定的安全保证是否已经或未打破。
Accordingly it is now quite unnecessary, in these unsafe port or unsafe berth cases, to refer back to the multitude of earlier decisions, notwithstanding repeated attempts by Counsel so to do, which we have strongly discouraged in the present case. There is the law clearly stated. What has to be determined by the tribunal of fact in each case is whether, on the particular facts, the particular warranty of safety has or has not been broken.
针对本案的租船合同条款,Roskill勋爵认为毫无疑问对最终提名的船舶装载港有明确的安全保证。Roskill勋爵认为如刚才所说的那样,Destrehan就在密西西比河中,而众所周知,密西西比河是一条具有某些特征的河流,相关的一条河流不时会淤积,而且淤泥可能使船只无法到达其上游港口,而且已经到达的船舶可能无法在他们希望的情况下返回公海。Roskill勋爵认为正如他所说,这艘船被命令前往Destrehan。该轮于1月18日抵达河流三角洲,于1974年1月21日或22日抵达Destrehan。为了到达上游港口该轮必须经过所谓的SW Pass。这是Hermine轮这种大小的船舶可以通过上游港口上下移动的唯一通道。事实上,被告知-但认为这不重要-当该轮到达SW Pass大约13天后,又花了三天才到达Destrehan。但在1月21日或22日,该轮到达了指定港口。在那里考虑了一些,该轮装载了一个满舱满载的货物。没有加载该轮可能装载的满载货物,毫无疑问是考虑到吃水。但是,如果没有正确履行其在此租船合同下的装载义务,则不会提出任何投诉。该轮在1974年1月27日0045完成装载,装了28,074吨大豆,淡水吃水为35英尺1英寸。该轮远低于租船合同第23条款中规定的最大吃水深度38英尺。如果该轮满载,吃水将是35英尺10英寸,当时完成装载时河里的控制吃水是36英尺。所以-并且在案件的一个方面,这是重要的-如果该轮在装载完成后立即沿着河流开到公海,那么在航行到欧洲时都不会有任何困难。但不幸的是,装载完成后有两个延迟时间。第一次是1月27日0045至1月31日0530;第二次是从1月31日的0530到2月4日的1800。Roskill勋爵认为不需要说明这两个延迟时间之后的事情,并不是说承租人在任何方面都不应该因为这个延误而受到责备。
Roskill勋爵认为1月30日-这很重要-船舶从河流下来到Pilot Town,位于SW Pass上方,距离大海约25英里,距离Destrehan约115英里。当该轮到达那里时,密西西比河淤塞,就像所说的那样,是那条河流的地方性灾害,已经发生了,那年发生的淤塞比平时早发生了。因此,当该轮到达Pilot Town时,无法继续沿着河流前进。由于控制吃水已经减少到34英尺6英寸以下,持续20天,从1974年2月4日至24日的1800,该轮仍然无法继续往下游开。最终,由于采取了措施,该轮有可能继续沿着河流前行,但另一艘船Mary Lou轮的搁浅又造成了延误,被耽搁了10天。最终,该轮在1974年3月5日中午,才离开密西西比河。
出租人找承租人索赔延误赔偿,而索赔金额非常大,涉及这两个期间,20天和10天,共计30天;而且,提出索赔的唯一方式是作为对违反明确的安全保证的损害索赔。无论是否因违反租船合同的其他一些隐含条款而提出索赔,Roskill勋爵认为都不会停下来考虑,它仅用于违反明确的安全保证。据说有违反此明示保证的行为,因为承租人在保证期内实际承诺,当船舶驶入Pilot Town时,由于缺水,可以在那里顺利航行,并且到达大海,因为船舶无法这样做,出租人遭受了承租人承担责任的损害。
Roskill勋爵认为在这一点上应该提一下,这艘船在任何时候都不会遭受任何物理损坏。该争议以及未涉及的某些其他争议已提交给租船合同仲裁。这两位仲裁员是著名的波罗的海仲裁员Selwyn及Kazantzis先生,他们任命Staughton Q.C.为首席裁判员。但是,在这种情况下,两位仲裁员同意Staughton Q.C.不参与裁决。
Roskill勋爵认为在本案中,没有必要就Donaldson法官这一点表达任何结论性意见。只想说觉得有点好奇的是,在这艘船被延误的情况下,一个港口应该被视为不安全,但不会在这一点上做出决定。Roskill勋爵认为这个案件迄今为止在物理上非常安全,但目前并非如此。在这种情况下,由于非常尊重学识渊博的法官,得出的结论是他在主要观点上得出了错误的结论。
Roskill勋爵认为他已经充分表明了这一争议的性质:这种延迟是否足以“商业上不可接受”或者在出租人可以抱怨它导致违反安全保证之前,延迟必须具有落空的性质?
Roskill勋爵承认“商业上不可接受”这个短语是一个相当困难的概念,因为不确定该测试适用的标准。是否仅从出租人或承租人的角度来申请?如果这意味着如果出租人意识到这种延迟的可能性,他们就不会以这些条款进入租船合同,那可能就是这样。合同通常是在没有各方理解某些事件发生时可能产生的结果的情况下进行的。但事实上,事后看,某些事情可能在商业上是不可接受的,但这本身并不涉及违反合同的情况。
In the present case I do not find it necessary to express any concluded view on this point. Suffice it to say that I do find it a little curious that a port should be condemned as unsafe in the circumstances in which this ship came to be delayed, but I do not rest my decision upon that point. Some of the problems to which Grace gives rise may, at some future date, have to be reconsidered in relation to a case such as the present in connection with an up-river port which has hitherto been physically perfectly safe, but the present is not such a case, for with very great respect to the learned Judge I have come to the conclusion that he reached the wrong conclusion on the principal point-what he called the real issue argued before him.
I have already sufficiently indicated the nature of that dispute: Is it enough for the delay to be \"commercially unacceptable\" or has the
delay got to be of a frustrating nature before the owner can complain of it as creating a breach of the warranty of safety?
I confess that I find the phrase \"commercially unacceptable\" a rather difficult concept because I am uncertain by what standards that test falls to be applied. Do you apply it from the point of view only of the shipowner or of the charterer as well? If it means that if the shipowners appreciated the possibility of this delay they would not have entered into a charter-party in these terms, that may well be so. Contracts are often entered into without the parties appreciating possible results that may arise if certain events happen. But the fact that something may, with hindsight, be commercially unacceptable does not of itself involve that there has been a breach of contract.
毫无疑问,近年来,当考虑到延误问题时,例如在这种情况下出现的延误问题,并且在租船人未能提供任何货物装载的情况下,承认出租人无权寻求取消合同,除非并且直到由于未能提供货物而造成的延误是为了冒险落空。阐明该原则的经典案例是Universal Cargo Carriers'Corporation v. Citati,[1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep.191; [1957] 2 Q.B案。但是,在法院大法官Devlin的判决很久之前,这个问题在本法院不止一次得到批准,SS Knutsford Ltd.v.Tillmanns&Co.[1908] AC 406也出现了类似的问题。同样的案例Channell法官在Tillmanns Co.v. SS Knutsford,[1908] 1 KB185案之前报道[1908] 2 K.B. 385 -这是重要的-在上诉法院。事实很简单,该船从Middlesbrough前往日本运送货物。然后前往Vladivostock,当时Vladivostok被冰封了,当船舶离Vladivostok 40英里范围内时,由于冰块,船舶无法进入港口。担心船舶的螺旋桨可能会被冰损坏,试了三天才穿过冰,然后回到了长崎。然后,根据出租人的命令,在那里卸货。但是第二天冰块被清除了:进入Vladivostok是安全的,其他船舶能够进入。出租人在被承租人起诉时寻求证明他们在长崎卸货的行为是合理的,而不是等待并根据条款前往Vladivostok;但如果船长认为在战争,干扰或任何其他原因导致货物在其他港口卸货,船舶的入口和卸货不安全。出租人的请求在所有三个法庭都失败了。它受到了Channell法官的拒绝,在本法院被强烈拒绝,并且在贵族院的临时陈述中被进一步拒绝。Kennedy勋爵在案中说:
无法接近是一个事实问题,例如,无人驾驶可能是蒸汽船的一件事,也可能是帆船的另一件事,但是,在此情况下,这是一个事实,涉及影响船只入口的现有条件-船舶进入港口被延误;在我看来,这或者意味着要么是永久性的障碍,要么就是障碍的性质不是绝对永久性的,那么无法进入意味着就目前的持续时间而言无法进入为了使船舶延迟,直到障碍物不再存在,这种延迟实际上和商业上都会使冒险受挫。
There has been, without doubt, a tendency in recent years, when considering problems of delay such as arise in this case and have arisen where a charterer had failed to supply any cargo to load, to hold that the owner is not entitled to seek to rescind the contract unless and until the delay occasioned by the failure to supply a cargo is such as to frustrate the adventure. The classic case which enunciated that principle is Universal Cargo Carriers' Corporation v. Citati, [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191; [1957] 2 Q.B. 401. But long before that decision of Mr. Justice Devlin, which has been more than once approved in this Court, a rather similar problem arose in S.S. Knutsford Ltd. v. Tillmanns & Co., [1908] A.C. 406. The same case is reported before Mr. Justice Channell as Tillmanns Co. v. S.S. Knutsford, [1908] 1 K.B. 185 and-and this is what matters-in the Court of Appeal in [1908] 2 K.B. 385. The facts were very . The vessel went from Middlesbrough to Japan to deliver her cargo. She then sailed for Vladivostok. Vladivostok, at that time, was ice bound, and when the vessel got within 40 miles of Vladivostok she could not get into port because of the ice. She feared that her propeller might be damaged by ice. She tried for three days to get through the ice and then went back to Nagasaki. Then, following orders from her owners, she there discharged her cargo. But the next day the ice cleared: access to Vladivostok was safe and other vessels were able to get in. The owners sought, when sued by the charterers, to justify their action in discharging at Nagasaki instead of waiting and going to Vladivostok under a clause which provided that should the entry and discharge at the port be deemed by the master unsafe in consequences of war, disturbance or any other cause the cargo could be discharged at some other port. That plea by the shipowners failed in all three tribunals. It was rejected by Mr. Justice Channell, it was emphatically rejected in this Court, and it was further rejected in the House of Lords in extempore speeches. I will quote from the reserved judgment of Lord Justice Kennedy (at p. 407), the third judgment in this Court:
. . . Inaccessibility is a question of fact . . . For example, inaccessibility might be one thing for a steamer and another thing for a sailing ship, but, subject to that, it is a fact relating to the conditions existing which affect the entrance of a vessel-the access of the vessel to the port for which she is destined; and it means, as it appears to me, either something which is a permanent obstacle to access, or, if the nature of the obstacle is not absolutely permanent, inaccessibility means an impossibility of access in respect of the duration of time which is so far lasting as to make the delay of the ship until the obstacle shall have ceased to exist a delay which would practically and in a mercantile sense frustrate the adventure . . .
那位非常杰出的商业律师的声明说,除非由于Vladivostok的冰所造成的延误使得冒险落空,船长和出租人没有理由在另一个港口卸货。出租人的代表律师辩称,这段陈述尚未得到贵族院的批准,并且贵族院已经取代了其他一些测试,并且通过Chancellor勋爵,Loreburn勋爵所使用的短语“过度延迟”或其他博学的法律勋爵用其他短语来表示其他内容。Roskill勋爵认为Macnaghten勋爵所说,Channell法官和上诉法院的判决是正确的。正如所说的那样,这些是临时陈述,在Roskill勋爵看来,除了辩论之外,贵族院批准了上诉法院所说的话。如果他们打算以非常明确的方式运用与Kennedy大法官所宣布的测试不同的东西,不能怀疑委员会如此清楚地说出来,相反,他们没有。然后说:哦,这是一个与现在完全不同的情况,因为这是出租人试图证明在另一个港口卸货的理由;而本案的情况是被认为一个涉嫌违反安全保证。在Roskill勋爵看来,在商业法领域,在考虑延迟后果的问题的情况下,原则上应尽可能适用相同的测试。就像刚才所说的那样,现在是自Citati案件以来的明确法律,即出租人不能抛出租船合同仅仅因为(使用这里特殊情况下使用的短语)“商业上不可接受的延迟”,也就是说,延迟超过合理的时间。这种情况的延迟必须在他寻求撤销并将承租人的行为视为对承租人的承担义务的否定之前,这样才会使冒险落空。Roskill勋爵认为如果可以恭敬地这样说,那么这个决定似乎完全符合他的观点,Kennedy大法官在Tillmanns v.Knutsford案中的观点,正如已经说过的那样,这一观点得到了贵族院的批准。
I read that statement by that very distinguished commercial lawyer as saying that unless the delay caused by the ice at Vladivostok had been such as to frustrate the adventure the master and the owners were not justified in discharging that cargo at an alternative port. Mr. Diamond argued that that passage had not been approved by the House of Lords, and that the House had substituted some other test, and meant something else by the phrase used by Lord Loreburn, Lord Chancellor, \"inordinate delay\" or by other phrases used by the other learned law Lords. I draw attention to the fact that Lord Macnaghten said that the judgments of Mr. Justice Channell and the Court of Appeal were quite right. These, as I have said, were extempore speeches, and it seems to me beyond argument (with all respect to Mr. Diamond) that the House approved what had been said by the Court of Appeal. Had they intended to apply something different from the test enunciated by Lord Justice Kennedy in such very clear terms I cannot doubt that their Lordships would have said so clearly; on the contrary, they did not.
It is then said: \"Oh, that was a very different case from the present, because that was an attempt by the owners to justify discharge of cargo at an alternative port, whereas the present is a case where the ship is held up through an alleged breach of warranty of safety\". It seems to me that, in this field of commercial law, where questions of the consequences of delay are under consideration, it is desirable that, in principle, the same tests should be applicable wherever possible. It is now, as I said a few moments ago, clear law since the Citati case that a shipowner cannot throw up a charter-party
merely because there has been (to use the phrase used in the special case here) \"commercially unacceptable delay\", that is to say, delay exceeding a reasonable time. The delay in such a case must, before he can seek to rescind and treat the charterer's conduct as a repudiation of the charterer's obligation to load, be such as will frustrate the adventure. That decision seems to me to be wholly in line, if I may respectfully say so, with Lord Justice Kennedy's view in Tillmanns v. Knutsford, a view which, as I have already said, was approved by the House of Lords.
法院面临与McNair法官在Vancouver Strike([1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep.229)案中一个相当类似的问题,在本法院的Reardon Smith Line Ltd.v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,[1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep.385; [1962] 1 Q.B案,那些是非常复杂的案件并提出了许多观点。当然,出租人的代表律师说当时没有出现过安全保证的问题。但有人提出争论的其中一个问题是承租人是否违反了指定港口的情况-在Vancouver案,当有人认为,在合理的时间内罢工没有前景时,这是罢工的;律师依据上诉人的不安全港口或不安全的泊位案件。 Tillmanns诉Knutsford,我刚才提到的,是论证中提到的案件之一。与McNair法官一样,该法院毫不犹豫地拒绝了这一论点。据说,在可以说涉及违反承租人违规行为之前的延误,必定是足已落空的延误。Willmer勋爵最充分地论述了这一点,学识渊博的大法官说:
考虑到这些非常明确的权威,我认为,只有当阻碍或障碍物具有相当程度的持久性时,才能暗示对承租人指定装货港的自由有任何限制。那么,要判断障碍物的持久性的标准是什么呢?出租人认为,如果以任何速度进行罢工,只要使船舶受到不合理的延误就足够了。另一方面,承租人表示,任何足以阻碍航行商业目标的障碍都会剥夺他们提名自己选择的港口的权利。在这个问题上,我毫不怀疑承租人是对的。如果出租人的争论是正确的,那么用什么尺度来衡量延误的不合理性是否会使航行的商业目标受挫?另一方面,承租人的争用提供了一个公认的测试,尽管无疑是对一个特定案件的事实申请并不总是容易的。而且,我认为,它得到了权威的充分支持。在S.S. Knutsford Ltd. v.Tillmanns&Co.,我已经提到过,检验标准表明是“过度延迟”。
A rather similar problem faced this Court, as it had faced Mr. Justice McNair, in the Vancouver Strike cases ([1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229), reported in this Court as Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 385; [1962] 1 Q.B. 42. Those were highly complex cases, and many points were argued. Mr. Diamond was, of course, right when he said that no question of a warranty of safety arose in that case. But one of the many points which were argued was whether the charterers were in breach in nominating a port-in that case Vancouver-which was strike bound when there was no prospect, it was argued, of the strike ending in a reasonable time; the unsafe port or the unsafe berth cases were relied upon by Counsel for the appellants. Tillmanns v. Knutsford, to which I have just referred, was among those cases referred to in the argument. This Court, like Mr. Justice McNair, had no hesitation in rejecting that argument. It was said that the delay, before it could be said to involve any breach by the charterers, must be a frustrating delay. The point is most fully dealt with in the judgment of Lord Justice Willmer in a passage at pp. 420 and 112. The learned Lord Justice said:
. . . Having regard to these very clear authorities I am of the opinion that any limitation on the charterers' to nominate the loading port can be implied only where the block or obstruction is something of a substantial degree of permanence. What, then, is the test by which the permanence of the obstacle is to be judged? The shipowners contend that, in the case of a strike at any rate, it is sufficient if it is such as to subject the ship to unreasonable delay. The charterers, on the other hand, say that nothing short of an obstruction sufficient to frustrate the commercial object of the voyage can deprive them of the right to nominate the port of their choice. On this issue I entertain no doubt that the charterers are right. If the shipowners' contention be right, by what yardstick is one to measure the unreasonableness of delay which falls short of frustrating the commercial object of the voyage? The charterers' contention, on the other hand, furnishes a well recognised test, though doubtless one that it will not always be easy to apply on the facts of a given case. Moreover, it is, I think, well supported by authority. In S.S. Knutsford Ltd. v. Tillmanns & Co., to which I have already referred, the test suggested was that of \"inordinate delay\".
Roskill勋爵认为在他看来,学识渊博的大法官在那里明显地对贵族院关于Kennedy勋爵的法律陈述的看法有着同样的看法,正如冒险做的那样。主审法官Sellers勋爵也说了同样的话,他的判决中的段落将在同一报告中的第407-409页和第87-90页中找到。因此,有一个难以接近的案件,如Knutsford v.Tillmanns。这些提名案件的延迟是与Vancouver Strike案件无关的安全问题。Roskill勋爵认为该法院和他认为Knutsford v.Tillmanns也是贵族院,已经表示,确定延迟是否足以证明有关出租人争辩的结果的管辖标准必须是这样的延迟,这将使商业冒险落空。
现在,在本案仲裁员面前,共同点是没有这种落空的延迟。在仲裁中为出租人出庭的代表律师承认(如果我可以这么说的话)这就是这个立场。因此,在仲裁员面前,在学识渊博的法官和本法院面前,如果必要的标准延迟会导致出租人必须失败的冒险,那么它就是共同点。在Roskill勋爵看来,原因与Willmer勋爵在Vancouver Strike案件中给出的原因相同,如果你用其他任何标准代替落空,你会使用一个在任何特定情况下都难以适用的尺度。您如何判断特定延迟是否在商业上不可接受?Roskill勋爵认为对于承租人来说,如果他不急于他的货物,并且如果他不需要向出租人支付延误费用,那么这对商业上来说是完全可以接受的。这些问题不能单方面地为一方的利益来判断。合同有两方,其共同权利和义务必须参照合同中明确或默示约定的方式确定。正如出租人代表律师所说的那样,根据任何特定情况的事实,可能很难确定延迟是否属于这种情况,而法律的这一部门知道困难。它是落空学说中固有的,因为它是本世纪由我们的法院发展起来的。
Roskill勋爵认为没有理由在法院所关注的情况下,应该在他已经提到的权威当局的各种案件中阐明的那种情况下应该采用不同的检验标准。因此,非常尊重学识渊博的法官,Roskill勋爵认为他在达成的结论中是错误的。Roskill勋爵认为仲裁员正确解释了权威当局,而且就这些权威而言,Roskill勋爵认为他们认为Destrehan不是一个不安全的港口是正确的。
因此,Roskill勋爵会回答法院提出的问题:“不”。会允许上诉,撤销Donaldson法官的决定,并维持两名非常有经验的仲裁员的裁决。
It seems to me that the learned Lord Justice is there plainly taking the same view of what the House of Lords thought about Lord Justice Kennedy's statement of the law as I have ventured to do.
Lord Justice Sellers, who gave the first judgment, said very much the same thing. The passage in his judgment will be found at pp. 407-409 and 87-90 in the same reports.
Thus one has the inaccessibility cases such as Knutsford v. Tillmanns. Thus one has the delay these nomination cases not connected with safety such as the Vancouver Strike cases. This Court, and (as I think) in Knutsford v. Tillmanns also the House of Lords, has said that the governing test determining whether the delay is sufficient to justify the result for which the shipowners concerned contended must be such delay as will frustrate the commercial adventure.
Now it was common ground before the arbitrators in the present case that there was no such frustrating delay. We are told that Mr. Diamond, who appeared for the shipowners in the arbitration, conceded (if I may say so very properly) that that was the position. Accordingly it has been common ground before the arbitrators, before the learned Judge and in this Court that if the requisite test was of a delay which would frustrate the adventure the shipowners must fail. It seems to me for the same reasons as those which Lord Justice Willmer gave in the Vancouver Strike cases, that if you substitute any other test than frustration you use a yardstick which is extremely difficult to apply in any given case. How do you judge whether a particular delay is commercially unacceptable? It may be perfectly acceptable commercially to the charterer if he is in no hurry for his cargo and if he does not have to pay the shipowner for the delay. These matters cannot be judged unilaterally in the interests of one party only. There are two parties to the contract and their mutual rights and obligations have to be determined by reference to that upon which they have expressly or impliedly agreed in their contract. It is true, as Mr. Diamond said, that on the facts of any given case it may be difficult to determine whether delay is of such a with this branch of the law knows the difficulty. It is inherent in the doctrine of frustration as it has been developed in this century by our Courts.
I see no reason why one should apply a different test, in the circumstances with which we are concerned, from that which has been enunciated in the various classes of case in the authorities to which I have already referred. Therefore, with very great respect to the learned Judge, I think he was wrong in the conclusion which he reached. I think that the arbitrators properly interpreted the authorities and, on those authorities, I think they were right in reaching the conclusion that Destrehan was not an unsafe port.
I would therefore answer the question asked of the Court: \"No\". I would allow the appeal, set aside the order of Mr. Justice Donaldson, and uphold the award of the two very experienced arbitrators.
Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为他也有同样的看法,希望在尊重这位学识渊博的法官时加上他自己的几句话,在这件事上,他们非常不情愿。在这个有些复杂的领域中的某些问题似乎很清楚。首先,如果指定的港口是进入或离开的港口,根据租船条款,该特定船舶可能仅以船舶损坏为代价(总是除了一些异常情况),它是一个不安全的港口。显然,在港口可以说不安全之前,船舶没有必要遭受实际损坏。
I am of the same opinion, and I wish to add only a few words of my own in deference to the learned Judge from whom one differs in a matter such as this with great reluctance. Certain matters in this somewhat convoluted field appear to be clear.
First of all, if the nominated port is a port into or away from which it is possible for this particular ship under the terms of the charter to get only at the cost of damage to the ship then (always excepting some abnormal circumstance) it is an unsafe port. Obviously it is not necessary for the ship to suffer actual damage before the port can be said to be unsafe.
其次,如果Devlin法官在Grace&Co。Ltd.v.General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.,(1950)83 Ll.L.Rep.297案中是正确的并且在这里适用,然后该港口不应被单独考虑,而是为了确定其安全性或其他方式包括其必要的方法。如果这些方式对于进港或离港都不安全,则港口本身是不安全的。
Secondly, if the judgment of Mr. Justice Devlin in Grace & Co. Ltd. v. General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., (1950) 83 Ll.L. Rep. 297; [1950] 2 K.B. 383 is correct and is applicable here (as to which I express no view) then the port is not to be considered in isolation but comprises, for the purposes of ascertaining its safety or otherwise, the necessary approaches thereto. If those are unsafe in the way described, either for access or for egress, then the port itself is unsafe.
第三,并不是每个危险都会使港口不安全,有两个主要的例外。首先,如果危险是所谓的“异常”危险,那么承租人将不会在其安全保证下负责。什么才构成异常是一个事实问题;在本案中,仲裁员对承租人的回应,无论是明确地还是必要的暗示,答案都是一样的;第4页他们的查证,因此:
如果异常事件的检验标准是1973年11月至次年2月的淤积水平,则没有这样的标记使得1973年至1974年间的差异构成异常事件。
Thirdly, it is not every hazard which will make the port unsafe. There are two main exceptions. First of all, if the hazard is what is called an \"abnormal\" one then the charterers will not be answerable under their warranty of safety. What constitutes abnormality is a question of fact; and in the present case it is answered by the arbitrators against the charterers, either expressly or by necessary implication, in par. P. 4 of their findings, thus:
. . . If the test for an abnormal event is the level of siltation from November to February 1973-4 then there was not such a marked difference as between 1973 and 1974 to constitute an abnormal event . . .
Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为第二个例外是,如果危险仅仅是一个临时危险,那么它不会构成缺乏安全,也不会使港口不安全。在权威当局看来,仅仅是暂时性的危险,或许并不完全清楚。危险或危险需要多长时间才能使港口不安全?它必须足够长,相当于一个令商业企业落空的事件,正如这里的承租人所争辩的那样,或者,正如出租人在这里所说的那样,对于这种类型的船舶的合理出租人来说,它在商业上是不可接受的。合同的时间(无论这意味着什么)?基于Roskill勋爵所给出的理由,在Geoffrey Lane勋爵看来,检验的标准是“是否落空”,而不是“商业上是否可接受”。
Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为这足以确定上诉,因为它被承认-并且恰当如此,如果可以这样说,这个词的真正含义中没有落空的事件存在于此。Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为这使得无需再决定进一步的问题,即:承租人的安全保证有多长?什么时候停止?如果它超出了装载的船准备开航的时间点,它会超出它的范围吗?所有这些都是未来可能需要决定的事项。Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为没有必要在这里开始进行危险的调查,因此将允许上诉。
The second exception is that if the hazard is merely a temporary one then it will not constitute lack of safety, nor make the port unsafe.
What, on the authorities, is a merely temporary hazard is, perhaps, not altogether clear. How long must the hazard or danger last in order to render the port unsafe? Must it be long enough to amount to an event frustrating the commercial venture, as the charterers here contend, or, as the owners contend here, is it sufficient that it can be described as commercially unacceptable to a reasonable owner of this type of ship at the time of the contract (whatever that may mean)? For the reasons given by my Lord, Lord Justice Roskill, it seems to me that the test is \"frustrated or no\" and not \"commercially unacceptable or no\".
That is sufficient to determine the appeal, because it is conceded-and properly so, if I may say so, by Mr. Diamond-that no frustrating event, in the true meaning of that phrase, exists here.
That makes it unnecessary to decide the further question, namely: How long does the charterer's warranty of safety last? When does it cease? If it goes beyond the point in time when the ship, loaded, is ready to sail, how far beyond that does it go? All these are matters which may have to be decided on some future occasion. There is no need, as I see it, for us to embark on that hazardous inquiry here.
I would allow the appeal.
David Cairns子爵认为有些怀疑是否阻止离开海洋,距离港口本身超过100英里的障碍物,可以说是港口不安全。然而,当事人的代表律师在任何阶段都没有提出这个论点,以及Devlin法官在GW Grace&Co。Ltd. v.General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.(1950) 83 Ll.L.Rep.297 案中的判决第304和391页支持这样的观点,即河流港口可能因远离港口本身的河流条件而变得不安全。
接下来很难确定安全保证延长的时间限制是什么。如果船舶在预定时间到达港口,并在预定时间离开,并立即前往海上,那么显然安全保证涵盖到达港口的时间与出发时间之间的时间。并且,在之前考虑的那一点上,到达河口和返回大海之间的整个时间。但是,这个问题是如何受到延迟到达,在装载过程中的影响或者-这在这种情况下特别相关-从港口到公海的过程?
第三,只有当某些条件存在使其在物理上不可能或危险地使用,进入或离开时,港口才是不安全的;或者它是否足以倾向于这种情况?
David Cairns子爵认为没有试图找到解决这些问题的方法,而权威当局几乎没有提供任何指导,他更倾向于像贵族院所做的那样,在案件的主要论点基础上做出法官的判断。仲裁,并在下面的法院,并且博学的法官与仲裁员不同。关于Donaldson法官,很满意,由于Roskill勋爵所给出的理由,正确的观点是,仅仅造成延误的阻碍不会使港口不安全,除非延误足以令冒险落空。在那个基础上,David Cairns子爵也允许上诉。
在本案中,密西西比河因为雨水等问题导致河道淤积,及SW Pass那有船舶搁浅导致离港延误,不构成港口不安全问题。在什么情况下所发生的延误可构成港口不安全问题,法官们认为必须足够长,使得航次落空,这和当事人商业上是否可接受没关系。同时法官们认为如果指定的港口是进入或离开的港口,根据租船条款,该特定船舶可能仅以船舶损坏为代价(总是除了一些异常情况),它是一个不安全的港口。同时在港口可以说不安全之前,船舶没有必要遭受实际损坏。只要船舶暴露于危险之中,而这种危险在采用良好的船艺之后仍导致船舶不能正常抵达,使用,驶离该港口,那么该港口是不安全港口;除非是由异常情况发生。很显然,密西西西比河在某个季节的高水位并不足以构成异常情况。
其中Geoffrey Lane勋爵在本案中认为如果指定的港口是进入或离开的港口,根据租船条款,该特定船舶可能仅以船舶损坏为代价(总是除了一些异常情况),它是一个不安全的港口。显然,在港口可以说不安全之前,船舶没有必要遭受实际损坏。为了确定其安全性或其他方式包括其必要的方法。如果这些方式对于进港或离港都不安全,则港口本身是不安全的。并不是每个危险都会使港口不安全,有两个主要的例外。首先,如果危险是所谓的“异常”危险,那么承租人将不会在其安全保证下负责。
Geoffrey Lane勋爵认为第二个例外是,如果危险仅仅是一个临时危险,那么它不会构成缺乏安全,也不会使港口不安全。在权威当局看来,仅仅是暂时性的危险,或许并不完全清楚。危险或危险需要多长时间才能使港口不安全?它必须足够长,相当于一个令商业企业落空的事件。因此如果在密西西比河中因为吃水问题或者航道因为其它船舶搁浅导致的延误,通常情况下并不构成港口不安全。
如果因为水流问题导致船舶缆绳破断,而又不存在船员疏忽,运用良好船艺又不能避免的情况下,情况将不一样,很可能构成港口不安全,承租人得承担相应的责任。
所谓五行,指的是水、火、木、金、土五种自然事物,水包括江河湖海之水、池沼井泉之水和霜雪雨露之水,火包括草木燃烧之火、霹雳雷电之火和日月之光辉,木包括各种树木、禾稼、野草之类,金包括各种金属以及珠宝,土包括田地、山石及玉类等。水气下沉,火气上腾,木气外放,金气内敛,土气宁静。古人认为,这五种事物是构成大千世界的基本元素,自然界各种事物的兴衰变化,生生灭灭,就是这五种基本元素运行的结果。“行”意思就是运行,古人认为,水、火、木、金、土的运行会影响到人的命运,所以,人的所作所为要符合五行的运行规律,才能顺天承命,兴旺发达。五行学说的核心思想,就是天人合一,顺应自然。
五行的运行遵循的规律是什么呢?五行之间主要存在着相生关系和相克关系,如下图所示:
五行之间的相生关系为:金生水,水生木,木生火,火生土,土生金。其基本意义是说,用金属制成的工具可以掘井得水,有水的地方草木会自然生长,草木可以燃烧生火,火燃烧他物会形成灰土,土里蕴藏着金属矿藏。
五行之间的相克关系为:金克木,木克土,土克水,水克火,火克金。其表达的意义是说,用金属制作的刀斧之类可以砍伐树木,树木的根系可以穿透泥土,泥土可以堵塞水流,水可以熄灭火焰,烈火可以熔化金属。
需要特别说明的是,上图表示的生克关系是五行在力量平衡情况下的关系,而在实际情况下,五行之间的力量大多是不平衡的,不是东风压倒西风,就是西风压倒东风,存在着力量强和弱的差别,所以,五行之间的生克不可简单而论。自然之理,通常都是强者克弱,弱难以克强。举例说,正常情况下,金本应克木,但若木质过坚,则反使刀斧受损,这叫恃强反克;水本能克火,若水量过少,则反被汽化消失,这叫虚弱无力。
因此,判断五行之间的生克关系,需要量力而行,通达权变,方称善之善者。辩证而言,五行的生克关系有如下诸多情况,在实际应用中需要仔细甄别。
如果此物由彼物所生,彼物过多亦非好事,将可能对此物不利。金赖土生,土多金埋;土赖火生,火多土焦;火赖木生,木多火炽;木赖水生,水多木漂;水赖金生,金多水浊。
如果彼物生此物,此物过多也可能对彼物造成不利。金能生水,水多金沉;水能生木,木多水缩;木能生火,火多木焚;火能生土,土多火晦;土能生金,金多土变。
如果一物克他物,但是,他物正当强盛之时,这种情况下,不但不能克他物,反而很可能会遭到他物反克。金能克木,木坚金缺;木能克土,土重木折;土能克水,水多土流;水能克火,火炎水热;火能克金,金多火熄。
如果一物正处于衰弱之时,这时遇他物来克,此物毫无抗衡之力,必死无疑。金衰遇火,必见销熔;火弱逢水,必为熄灭;水弱逢土,必为淤塞;土衰逢木,必遭倾陷;木弱逢金,必为斫折。
如果一物过于强盛,这时遇到他物来克反而是好事,可以起到祛邪扶正的功用。金旺得火,方成器皿;火旺得水,方成相济;水旺得土,方成池沼;土旺得木,方能疏通;木旺得金,方成栋梁。
如果一物偏强,但不至过强,这时最宜遇到此物相生的五行,因为,凡生一物,都会消耗此物的元气,叫做泄气,使其趋于平和,亦可谓美善。强金得水,方挫其锋;强水得木,方缓其势;强木得火,方泄其英;强火得土,方敛其焰;强土得金,方化其顽。
既然五行之间的生克关系,需要依据五行力量的强弱对比来具体定论,那么,怎么来判断五行的强弱呢?五行是随着季节时间的变化而发生盛衰变化,水、火、木、金、土各自盛衰有时,从而在生克上呈现出力量强弱的差异。五行的盛衰过程有五个阶段:旺、相、休、囚、死。旺意为强盛,相意为得助,休意为衰退,囚意为受困,死意为消亡。
具体而言,春季正月与二月,气温回暖,万木向荣,所以木旺。而木能生火,木旺则生火有力,所以火相。水能生木,木旺反使木多水缩,所以水休。金能克木,但此时木旺,其力正强,木反克金,所以金囚。木能克土,此时木正当旺时,恃强凌弱,所以土死。
夏季四月和五月,烈日炎炎,是火旺之时。火能生土,火旺对土有助强之功,所以土相。木能生火,火旺将会出现火多木焚的结果,所以木休;水能克火,但此时火当旺时,会形成反克,所以水囚。火能克金,正是火强盛之时,所向披靡,金不能抗,所以金死。
秋季七月和八月,因为秋气肃杀,而金素有杀伐之用,正得其时,所以金旺。金能生水,水借金力,所以水相。土能生金,金旺反而金多土变,所以土休。火能克金,金正强盛,火困穷难克,所以火囚。金能克木,金当旺时,锋芒毕露,此时木必被砍折,所以木死。
冬季十月和十一月,天气严寒,水流凝结,是水养精蓄锐之时,所以水旺。水能生木,水旺则木得佳境,所以木相。金能生水,水太多将出现水多金沉的情形,所以金休。土能克水,而水旺之时,土难相克,反受水冲,所以土囚。水能克火,此时是水最强之时,火必被熄灭,所以火死。
三月、六月、九月、十二月,这四个月称为季月,古人常用孟、仲、季来表示月份,如正月叫孟春,二月叫仲春,三月叫季春,夏季、秋季、冬季与此相同,所以六月叫季夏,九月叫季秋,十二月叫季冬。在这四个季月,是土强盛之时。土能生金,土强盛则多生金,所以金相。火能生土,土太强则出现土多火晦的情况,所以火休。木能克土,但土正值强盛,将致土重木折,所以木囚。土能克水,水遇厚土,必为淤塞,所以水死。
为便于查看,特编写如下五行盛衰变化表:
古人将五行与五方相配合,水居北方,火居南方,木居东方,金居西方,土居中央。
为什么五行与五方这样配合呢?这和河图有关系,河图乃五行之源。相传上古时黄河出一奇兽,似龙非龙,似马非马,背有花纹,古人称为河图,其图如下:
河图由55个黑白点组成,黑点为阴,白点为阳。北方一白点在内,六黑点在外;南方二黑点在内,七白点在外;东方三白点在内,八黑点在外;西方四黑点在内,九白点在外;中央五白点在内,十黑点在外。
古人认为,白点皆单数为阳,相合天气,天气轻清为阳;黑点皆双数为阴,相合地气,地气重浊为阴。天地阴阳二气交感,五行生焉。天一生水,地六成之,一六共宗,故水居北方;地二生火,天七成之,二七同道,故火居南方;天三生木,地八成之,三八为朋,故木居东方;地四生金,天九成之,四九作友,故金居西方;天五生土,地十成之,五十同途,故土居中央。
水一、火二、木三、金四、土五,此即五行生成的先后次序。
古人以五行的生成顺序,把60甲子按时间先后分成“五子运”:水运、火运、木运、金运、土运,每运12年。现行甲子如下:
1984—1995,水运;1996—2007,火运;2008—2019,木运;2020—2031,金运;2032—2043,土运。
有人说,用五子运可断宅运和命运吉凶。例如,坐北向南的坎宅,水运时运宅比和,大吉;火运时宅克运,吉凶参半;木运时宅生运,泄气小凶;金运时运生宅,益气小吉;土运时运克宅,大凶。人命亦然。笔者认为,以五子运来断吉凶,未免太简,断宅不如玄空,断命不如八字。
在术数运用中,还常常把各种形状如地形、图形、物形等归于五行之中,人们依据水、火、木、金、土的物理常态,赋予五行不同的形状:波浪形或梅花形属水,像涟漪之状;三角形或多角形属火,像火焰之状;长形或长方形属木,像干枝之状;圆形或半圆形属金,像珠宝之状;正方形或顶平形属土,古云天圆地方,像大地之状。
“吃得好,又不太劳动”,应该如何保养呢?“痿厥寒热”是现代人由于吃东西太好,又不大劳动造成的,那么如何调治呢?《黄帝内经》上有一句话,“其治宜导引按跷”肯定是个好东西,要怎么用呢?我们来回顾一下以前学的东南西北各个地方的人容易得什么病,怎么治。东方人吃鱼、吃盐太多,“鱼生火,肉生痰”,鱼肉属于高蛋白营养的食物,多余的热邪或盐分会从人的皮肤散出来,所以东方人腠理比较疏松。万一热邪或盐分散得不及时,就会在皮肤表面形成“痈疡(yong yang)”,就是我们常说的脓头、火疖子。这种症状治宜砭石,切开痈疡,引流排脓把热毒、热邪、脓血排出去就好了。
南方人腠理疏松,湿气比较大,容易得挛痹,就是身体收缩得过于厉害。那么,用针刺的方法治疗。北方人“吃乳食,居野处,天地闭藏者也”,且气温比较低,所以容易藏寒而生满病”,用的是艾灸的方法。西方人皮糙肉厚,臟腑容易出现问题,因此“治宜毒药,就是现在的中药。中原地区的人,食杂而不劳,容易出现痿厥寒热这些病症,最有效的治疗方法就是导、引、按、跷。所以,很多朋友一说看中医,就觉得一定要吃药,其实不是这样的。中医治法有很多,“异法方宜”,就是说治病的时候要想着因时、因地、因人制宜,选择最适宜,最好的方法。
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